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Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure
Julie E. Cohen†
INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the relationship between privacy and visibility in the networked information age. Visibility is an important determinant of harm to privacy, but a persistent tendency to conceptualize
privacy harms and expectations in terms of visibility has created two
problems. First, focusing on visibility diminishes the salience and obscures the operation of nonvisual mechanisms designed to render individual identity, behavior, and preferences transparent to third parties. The metaphoric mapping to visibility suggests that surveillance is
simply passive observation rather than the active production of categories, narratives, and norms. Part I explores this problem and identifies some of the reasons that US privacy jurisprudence has been particularly susceptible to it.
Second, even a broader conception of privacy harms as a function
of informational transparency is incomplete. Privacy has a spatial dimension as well as an informational dimension. The spatial dimension
of the privacy interest, which I characterize as an interest in avoiding
or selectively limiting exposure, concerns the structure of experienced
space. It is not negated by the fact that people in public spaces expect
to be visible to others present in those spaces, and it encompasses both
the arrangement of physical spaces and the design of networked
communications technologies. US privacy law and theory currently do
not recognize this interest at all. Part II argues that they should. Part
III argues that the spatial dimension of the privacy interest extends to
online conduct and considers some implications of that view for current debates about expectations of privacy online. Part IV offers some
preliminary thoughts on how the privacy interest against exposure
might affect thinking about privacy self-defense.

† Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to Susan Cohen, Oscar
Gandy, Ian Kerr, David Phillips, Neil Richards, Rebecca Tushnet, participants in the Unblinking
Workshop at UC Berkeley, and participants in The University of Chicago Law School’s Surveillance Symposium for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, to Kirstie Ball for sharing her work in progress on exposure as an organizing concept for surveillance, and to Amanda
Kane and Christopher Klimmek for research assistance.
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I. VISIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
Within US legal culture, debates about privacy traditionally have
reflected a relatively great concern with visibility and visual privacy
issues. Over the last decade, the principal contribution of what has
1
been dubbed the “information privacy law project” has been to refocus both scholarly and popular attention on the other ways in which
contemporary practices of surveillance operate to render individuals
and their behaviors accessible in the networked information age. Yet
the information privacy law project remains more closely tied to visibility than this description would suggest; its principal concern has
been with data trails made visible to others. And to the extent that the
information privacy law project conceptualizes privacy interests as
interests against informational accessibility, its grasp of the workings
and effects of surveillance is incomplete. Surveillance is only partly
about the gathering and dissemination of fixed, preexisting information
about identified individuals. Designations like “at risk,” “no-fly,” “soccer
moms,” “business elite,” and “shotguns and pickups” are not preexisting
facts. Surveillance also depends importantly on other, informationcreating activities that lie outside the frame of visibility altogether.
An implicit linkage between privacy and visibility is deeply embedded in privacy doctrine. Within the common law of privacy, harms
to visual privacy and harms to information privacy are subject to different requirements of proof. Of the four privacy torts, two are primarily visual and two primarily informational. The visual torts, intrusion upon seclusion and unauthorized appropriation of name or likeness, require only a showing that the conduct (the intrusion or appropriation) violated generally accepted standards for appropriate behav2
ior. The informational torts, unauthorized publication and false light,
are far more stringently limited (to “embarrassing” private facts and
3
to falsity). To make out a more general claim to information privacy,
some have tried to characterize collections of personally identified
data visually, likening them to “portraits” or “images,” but courts have
4
resisted the conflation of facts with faces. The body of constitutional
privacy doctrine that defines unlawful “searches” regulates tools that
enable law enforcement to “see” activities as they are taking place
1
Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L J 1087 (2006).
I should note that I am one of the scholars identified with this project.
2
See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117 at 851–56 (West
5th ed 1984).
3
See id § 117 at 856–66.
4
See, for example, US News & World Report, Inc v Avrahami, 1996 WL 1065557, *6–7 (Va
Cir Ct); Dwyer v American Express Co, 652 NE2d 1351, 1355–56 (Ill App Ct 1995); Castro v NYT
Television, 851 A2d 88, 98 (NJ Super Ct 2004).
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inside the home more strictly than tools for discovering information
5
about those activities after they have occurred.
Within the academic literature on privacy, efforts to develop an
account of privacy interests in personal information have confronted
great skepticism, for reasons that seem closely linked to conventions
about visibility. Information privacy skeptics have argued that the information conveyed by most individual items of personal data is too
banal to trigger privacy interests. They have asserted, further, that privacy interests cannot attach to information voluntarily made “visible”
as part of an otherwise consensual transaction.
Under the influence of the information privacy law project, privacy discourse has changed. Many new legal and philosophical theories of privacy are organized explicitly around problems of information privacy and “privacy in public.” Some scholars assert a “constitutive” relationship between flows of personal information and self6
development. Helen Nissenbaum argues that the collection and aggregation of personal information disrupts expectations of “contextual
integrity” by allowing presence, appearance, and behavior in different
7
contexts to be juxtaposed. Drawing upon pragmatist philosophy and
phenomenology, Daniel Solove argues that “digital dossiers” threaten
a varied but related set of interests that are grounded in the logic of
8
everyday experience.
These theories suggest that the persistent theme of visibility in
privacy discourse is a distraction from the more fundamental problem
of informational accessibility. Although the theories differ from each
other in important respects, an implicit premise of all of them is that
databases and personal profiles can communicate as much or more
than images. To the extent that privacy is conceived as encompassing a
more general interest against accessibility, the adage that “a picture is
worth a thousand words” requires rethinking. Visibility is an important determinant of accessibility, but threats to privacy from visual
surveillance become most acute when visual surveillance and databased surveillance are integrated, enabling both real-time identifica5
See, for example, Kyllo v United States, 533 US 27, 29 (2001); California v Greenwood,
486 US 35, 40–41 (1988). See also R v Tessling, [2004] 3 SCR 432, 434 (Can). Kyllo was thought to
be a hard case precisely because it seemed to lie on the boundary between the two categories.
6
See, for example, Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object, 52 Stan L Rev 1373, 1424–25 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 Conn L Rev 815, 856–57 (2000). See also Luciano Floridi, The Ontological Interpretation of
Informational Privacy, 7 Ethics & Info Tech 185, 194–99 (2005).
7
See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 Wash L Rev 119
(2004). See also generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America (Random House 2000).
8
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal L Rev 1087 (2002).
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tion of visual surveillance subjects and subsequent searches of stored
visual and databased surveillance records. And, for the most part, informational accessibility does not result from a conscious decision to
target particular individuals. Rather, accessibility is embedded in the
9
design of social and technical institutions.
Even as information privacy theorists have sought to shift the focus of the discussion about privacy interests, however, the terms of
both academic and public debate continue to return inexorably to
visibility, and more particularly to an understanding of surveillance as
direct visual observation by centralized authority figures. Within popular privacy discourse, this metaphoric mapping tends to be organized
around the anthropomorphic figure of Big Brother. Academic privacy
theorists have tended to favor the motif of the Panopticon, a model
prison proposed by Jeremy Bentham that consists of cells concentrically arranged around a central guard tower, from which the prison
10
authority might see but not be seen. Historically and also etymologically, the Panopticon suggests that direct visual observation by a centralized authority is both the most effective means and the best exemplar of surveillance for social control.
It is not particularly surprising that the paradigm cases of privacy
invasion should be conceptualized in terms of sight. The cultural importance of visibility extends well beyond privacy law, and well beyond law more generally. Within Western culture, vision is linked
metaphorically with both knowledge and power. The eye has served
throughout history as a symbol of both secular and religious authority.
The Judeo-Christian God is described as all-seeing, and worldly lead11
ers as exercising “oversight” or “supervision.” Cartesian philosophy
of mind posits that objects and ideas exist in the “unclouded” mind,
12
where truth is revealed by the “light of reason.” In the language of
9
See, for example, Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the
Information Age 97–101 (NYU 2004); Richards, 94 Georgetown L J at 1095–1102 (cited in note
1); Schwartz, 32 Conn L Rev at 831 (cited in note 6), citing Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology, 76 Tex L Rev 553, 556 (1998).
10 See, for example, Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 Case W Res L Rev 297, 317–19
(2003); Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 213–14 (cited in note 7); Schwartz, 32 Conn L Rev at 852–53
(cited in note 6). See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 195–209
(Vintage 1977) (Alan Sheridan, trans) (describing the Panopticon).
11 The Hebrew Bible refers to God in a number of ways, including El-Roi, or “God who
sees.” See, for example, Genesis 16:13. The all-seeing God figures prominently in the religious
iconography of the Renaissance, and the linkages between vision, power, and knowledge continue in the subsequent secular iconography of the Enlightenment. See Astrit SchmidtBurkhardt, The All-Seer: God’s Eye as Proto-surveillance, in Thomas Y. Levin, Ursula Frohne,
and Peter Weibel, eds, Ctrl [Space]: Rhetorics of Surveillance from Bentham to Big Brother 17,
18–26 (MIT 2002).
12 See Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in 31 Great Books of the Western World 4 (Encyclopædia Britannica 1952) (Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, trans). See
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everyday conversation, someone who understands is one who “sees”;
someone who doesn’t get it is “blind.” Claims of privacy invasion are
claims about unwanted subjection to the knowledge or power of others. Within this metaphoric framework, it makes sense for such claims
to be conceptualized in terms of seeing and being seen.
Yet this way of understanding privacy carries significant intellectual and political costs. If it makes sense to conceptualize privacy
problems in terms of visibility, it also makes sense to conclude that
problems that cannot be so conceptualized are not privacy problems.
As Solove observes, identifying privacy problems becomes analytically
13
more difficult when there is no single Big Brother at which to point.
Privacy doubters, meanwhile, often cannot get past the ways in which
the practices that privacy advocates seek to challenge fail to align with
the dominant metaphors. But knowledge, power, and sight are not the
same. If “privacy” really is meant to denote an effective barrier to
knowledge or the exercise of power by others, equating privacy invasion with visibility assumes what ought to be carefully considered.
Work within the emerging field of surveillance studies calls into
question the implicit linkages between surveillance, visual observation,
and centralization that the conventional metaphors for privacy invasion have tended to reinforce. Scholars in this field have brought a
variety of allied disciplines—including sociology, urban geography,
communications theory, and cultural studies—to bear on the institutions and subjects of surveillance. This work enables a richer understanding of how surveillance functions, and of what “privacy” interests
might include.
Much work in surveillance studies builds upon Michel Foucault’s
landmark study of the prison and its role in the emergence of modern
14
techniques of social discipline. US privacy theorists have drawn on
this work primarily for its discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, but
have tended not to notice that Foucault offered the Panopticon as a
metaphor for a different and more comprehensive sort of discipline
that is concerned more fundamentally with classification and normali15
zation. One of his central insights was that in modern societies social
discipline is accomplished by statistical methods. “[W]hereas the jualso George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought 393–96 (Basic Books 1999). According to Bernard Hibbitts, the cultural
preeminence of sight is linked to the spread of literacy, and reached its zenith with the development
of Cartesian rationalism. Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 Cardozo L Rev 229, 244–61 (1994).
13 See Solove, The Digital Person at 33–35 (cited in note 9).
14 See generally Foucault, Discipline and Punish (cited in note 10).
15 See id at 205–06. The exception is James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance,
Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177, 184–88 (1997).
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ridical systems define juridical subjects according to universal norms,
the disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a
scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one an16
other and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate.” This process does
not require a centralized authority; instead, it is most powerful when it
is most widely dispersed among the civil and private institutions that
17
regulate everyday life. These observations, which have obvious application to a wide variety of statistical and actuarial practices performed
in both government and private sectors, have served as the foundation
18
for elaboration of the work of modern “surveillance societies.”
Surveillance in the panoptic sense thus functions both descriptively and normatively. It does not simply render personal information
accessible but rather seeks to render individual behaviors and preferences transparent by conforming them to preexisting frameworks. And
in seeking to mold the future, surveillance also shapes the past: by creating fixed records of presence, appearance, and behavior, surveillance
19
constitutes institutional and social memory.
Some surveillance theorists argue that surveillance in postindustrial, digitally networked societies is even more radically decentralized
and resilient than Foucault’s work suggests. Building on Gilles
20
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work on systems of social control,
Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson argue that the prevailing modality of surveillance is the “surveillant assemblage”: a heterogeneous,
loosely coupled set of institutions that seek to harness the raw power
of information by fixing flows of information cognitively and spa21
tially. Surveillant assemblages grow rhizomatically, “across a series of
interconnected roots which throw up shoots in different locations,”
and for this reason they are extraordinarily resistant to localized dis22
ruption. Of critical importance, the surveillant assemblage operates
16

Foucault, Discipline and Punish at 223 (cited in note 10).
Id at 207–17, 222–27.
18 See David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life 33–35, 114–18 (Open
University 2001); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information 15–52 (Westview 1993). See generally David Murakami Wood, ed, Surveillance Studies Network,
A Report on the Surveillance Society (Mark Siddoway/Knowledge House 2006); Kirstie Ball, Elements of Surveillance: A New Framework and Future Directions, 5 Info Commun & Socy 573 (2002).
19 See Michael R. Curry and Leah A. Lievrouw, Places to Read Anonymously: The Ecology
on Attention and Forgetting 5 (working paper, 2004), online at http://www.spatial.maine.edu/~nittel/lp/
curry-lievrouw_paper.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008), quoting Jean-François Blanchette and Deborah
G. Johnson, Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 18 Info
Socy 33, 35 (2002).
20 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia
(Minnesota 1987) (Brian Massumi, trans).
21 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 Brit J Sociology 605, 605 (2000).
22 Id at 614.
17
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upon its subjects not only by the “normalized soul training” of Fou23
cauldian theory, but also by seduction. Flows of information within the
surveillant assemblage promise a cornucopia of benefits and pleasures,
including price discounts, social status, and voyeuristic entertainment. In
return, the surveillant assemblage demands full enrollment.
An alternative approach to surveillance studies uses performance
theory to interrogate the effects of networked databases on the performance of identity. Performance theory melds the methodologies of
speech act theory, which emphasizes the performative force of utterances; cultural anthropology, which describes culture as arising
through performance; and deconstruction, which regards language as
24
encoding multiple texts rather than universal truths. Performance
theorists argue that “identity” is neither fixed nor unitary, but rather is
25
constituted by performances that are directed at different audiences.
From this perspective, the problem with surveillance is that it seeks to
constitute individuals as fixed texts upon which invariant meanings
26
can be imposed. The struggle for privacy is recast as the individual’s
effort to assert multiplicity and resist “norming.” This account emphasizes agency to a far greater degree than the Foucauldian and Deleuzian accounts. It too is concerned with normalization and transparency, but it argues that human nature is much more impervious to
normalization and transparency than those literatures suggest, and
that the subjects of surveillance are knowing and only partially compliant participants in their own seduction.
Unlike their European and Canadian counterparts, US privacy
theorists generally have resisted making these connections between
transparency, normalization, seduction, and fixity of meaning. Some
US privacy theorists have argued that the collection and aggregation
of personal information is harmful because it creates the potential for

23

Id at 615–16.
Canonical works in these fields include J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Harvard 1962); Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in The
Interpretation of Cultures 3 (Basic 1973); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life (Doubleday Anchor 1959); Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context, in Margins of Philosophy 307 (Chicago 1982) (Alan Bass, trans).
25 See, for example, Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Introduction, in Andrew
Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, eds, Performativity and Performance 1, 6–8 (Routledge 1995);
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 24–25 (Routledge 1990).
26 See David J. Phillips, From Privacy to Visibility: Context, Identity, and Power in Ubiquitous Computing Environments, 23 Soc Text 95, 101 (2005); John E. McGrath, Loving Big Brother:
Performance, Privacy and Surveillance Space 12–14 (Routledge 2004); Hille Koskela, Webcams,
TV Shows, and Mobile Phones: Empowering Exhibitionism, 2 Surveillance & Socy 199, 206
(2004); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 Am U L Rev 393, 417–24 (2002).
24
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27

hasty and erroneous judgments. That argument seems to presume the
existence of a fixed self defined by a set of invariant, theoretically accessible truths; it suggests that the problem with profiling is its inevitable, unacceptably high rate of error. Antidiscrimination theorists
have focused on the ways in which profiling intersects with harmful
stereotypes about minority groups, but have tended to resist generaliz28
ing that insight to profiling and normalization more generally. Surveillance theorists, in contrast, argue that the logics of transparency
29
and discrimination are inseparable. They also identify a more fundamental inequality embedded in the logic of informational transparency. The transparency sought by surveillance runs only one way; it
does not extend to the algorithms and benchmarks by which all individuals in surveillance societies are categorized and sorted.
US privacy scholars’ resistance to the theoretical approaches employed by surveillance studies scholars also is not especially surprising,
as it is rooted in core commitments—to individual autonomy and to
the possibility of value-neutral knowledge of human nature—that derive from the tradition of liberal political economy within which US
legal academics are primarily trained. Those commitments tend to
foreclose other approaches that emphasize the mutually constitutive
interactions between self and culture, the social construction of systems of knowledge, and the interplay between systems of knowledge
and systems of power. They therefore require rejection of the docile
bodies of Foucauldian theory, the assimilated denizens of Deleuzian
systems of social control, and the fragmentary, protean selves posited
by performance theorists.
It is possible, however, to meld all three sets of insights about the
function of surveillance with the more traditionally liberal concerns
that have preoccupied US privacy theorists. One can choose to understand liberal political theory and Foucauldian poststructuralism as
delineating irreconcilable opposites, or one can understand them as
describing two (equally implausible) endpoints on a continuum along
which social influence and individual liberty combine in varying proportions. As a counterpoint to the universalist aspirations of liberal
political theory, Foucauldian theory seeks to cultivate a critical stance
27 See generally Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze (cited in note 7); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues
of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclosure, 53 Duke L J 967 (2003).
28 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 22 (Belknap
2003); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn L Rev 1
(2000); David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System 16–27
(New Press 1999).
29 See, for example, Oscar Gandy, Jr., Data Mining, Surveillance, and Discrimination in the
Post-9/11 Environment, in Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, eds, The New Politics of
Surveillance and Visibility 363, 363–64 (Toronto 2006).
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30

toward claims to knowledge. Performance theory takes background
social shaping for granted and focuses on the range of motion that it
affords for the process of self-articulation through experimentation
and play. Haggerty and Ericson’s theory of the surveillant assemblage,
meanwhile, seeks to cultivate a subtler appreciation of the affective
dimensions of social control. In a society committed at least to the
desirability of the liberal ideal of self-determination, these perspectives on surveillance are important. In such a society, pervasive transparency is troubling because it constrains the range of motion for the
development of subjectivity through both criticism and performance,
and it does not automatically cease to be troubling when the subjects
of surveillance have indicated their willing surrender.
This account of the relation between informational transparency
and subjectivity is attractive, moreover, because it offers a useful perspective on philosophical differences among US legal theorists and
philosophers about the ultimate value of privacy. Some theorists have
asserted that privacy serves principally instrumental values, while others are adamant in linking privacy deontologically to care for the (liberal) self. Privacy performs both functions. Choices about the permissible extent and nature of surveillance are choices about the scope for
self-articulation; in a very real sense, they are what enable or disable
pursuit of the ideal that the liberal self represents. For precisely that
reason, they are also choices about the definition and articulation of
collective identity.
The account of privacy as relative informational opacity runs into
difficulty, however, when we return to the problem of visual surveillance in public places. In particular, an informational transparency
framework for conceptualizing privacy harms suggests that purely
localized visual surveillance is relatively innocuous. The real danger to
privacy comes from databases; visual surveillance creates pressing
privacy threats only when it is digital, networked, and combined with
other sources of information. Yet the theory doesn’t align with the
practice: surveillance cameras produce effects that are experienced by
real people as altering levels of experienced privacy. This suggests that
the informational transparency framework is incomplete.
II. VISIBILITY AND EXPOSURE
Linking privacy to informational transparency tends to mask a
conceptually distinct privacy harm that is spatial, and concerns the
30 Consider Bernard E. Harcourt, An Answer to the Question: “What Is Poststructuralism?,”
(Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 156, Mar 2007), online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=970348 (visited Jan 12, 2008).
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nature of the spaces constituted by and for pervasive, continuous observation. Those spaces are characterized by what I will call a condition of exposure. The term “condition” is intended to signify that exposure is not a given but rather a design principle that in turn constrains the range of available behaviors and norms. Neither privacy
law nor privacy theory has recognized an interest in limiting exposure
uncoupled from the generally acknowledged interest in limiting observation, and in general we lack a vocabulary for conceptualizing and
evaluating such an interest.
Since the US legal system purports to recognize an interest in
spatial privacy, it is useful to begin there. Doctrinally, whether surveillance invades a legally recognized interest in spatial privacy depends
in the first instance on background rules of property ownership. Generally speaking, surveillance is fair game within public space, and also
within spaces owned by third parties, but not within spaces owned by
the targets of surveillance. Those baseline rules, however, do not invariably determine the outcomes of privacy disputes. Expectations
deemed objectively reasonable can trump the rules that otherwise
would apply in a particular space. Thus, for example, a residential tenant is entitled to protection against direct visual observation by the
31
landlord even though she does not own the premises, and a homeowner is not necessarily entitled to protection against direct visual
32
observation by airplane overflight, nor to privacy in items left out for
33
garbage collection. Employees sometimes can assert privacy interests
34
against undisclosed workplace surveillance.
For purposes of this essay, the interesting thing about the reasonable expectations test is that it is fundamentally concerned not with
expectations about the nature of particular spaces, but rather with
expectations about the accessibility of information about activities
taking place in those spaces. Even the exceptions prove the rule: Kyllo
35
v United States, styled as a ringing reaffirmation of the traditional
privacy interest in the home, in fact upholds that interest only against
36
information-gathering technologies “not in general public use.” Similarly, although legal scholars disagree about the precise nature of the
privacy interest, they seem to agree that cognizable injury would re31 See Hamberger v Eastman, 206 A2d 239, 242 (NH 1964). See also Chapman v United
States, 365 US 610, 616–17 (1961).
32 See Florida v Riley, 488 US 445, 451 (1989); California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 214–15
(1986).
33 See California v Greenwood, 486 US 35, 40 (1988).
34 See O’Connor v Ortega, 480 US 709, 713–14 (1987); Mancusi v DeForte, 392 US 364, 369
(1968).
35 533 US 27 (2001).
36 Id at 34.
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quire the involvement of a human observer who perceives or receives
37
information. Focusing on the accessibility of information also explains
why no privacy interest attaches to most activities in public spaces and
nonresidential spaces owned by third parties: persons who voluntarily
enter such premises have impliedly consented to being seen there.
In short, and paradoxically, prevailing legal understandings of
spatial privacy do not recognize a harm that is distinctively spatial:
that flows from the ways in which surveillance, whether visual or databased, alters the spaces and places of everyday life. The information
privacy law project has tended to ratify this omission, precisely because its primary interest has been information rather than the bodies
and spaces to which it pertains. Many information privacy theorists
criticize spatial metaphors in privacy discourse, arguing that they
38
muddy rigorous analysis of privacy issues in the information age.
And this resistance too is rooted in the tradition of liberal political
economy, which for the most part does not consider concrete, particular bodies and spaces at all.
Yet resistance to spatialization in privacy theory leaves important
dimensions of the experience of surveillance unexplained. Consider an
individual who is reading a newspaper at a plaza café in front of a
downtown office building. The building’s owner has installed surveillance cameras that monitor the plaza on a twenty-four-hour basis.
Let’s assume the cameras in this example are clearly visible, and
clearly low-tech and analog. It would be reasonable for the individual
to assume that they probably are not connected to anything other
than the building’s own private security system. Most likely, tapes are
stored for a short period of time and then reused. The consensus view
in US privacy theory tends to be that there is essentially no legitimate
expectation of privacy under these circumstances, and that the surveillance therefore should not trouble us. But those surveilled often feel
quite differently. Even localized, uncoordinated surveillance may be
experienced as intrusive in ways that have nothing to do with whether
39
data trails are captured. Or consider the ways in which spatial meta37 See, for example, Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze at 8 (cited in note 7); Lisa Austin, Privacy
and the Question of Technology, 22 Law & Phil 119, 126 (2003); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 Yale L J 421, 432 (1980) (“[A]ttention alone will cause a loss of privacy even if
no new information becomes known.”).
38 See, for example, Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1094–95, 1151 (cited in note 8); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds, The
Right to Privacy 25, 26–27 (Cambridge 2000). The exception is Helen Nissenbaum, who does not
criticize spatialization and whose “contextual integrity” framework for privacy accommodates
spatial privacy interests. See Nissenbaum, 79 Wash L Rev at 137–42 (cited in note 7).
39 See generally Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public
Space (Guilford 2003). See also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of
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phors continually recur in discussions of privacy. Even in contexts that
are not thought to involve spatial privacy at all, judges and scholars
repeatedly refer to “spheres” and “zones” to describe the privacy that
40
the law should attempt to guarantee.
Because information-based analytical frameworks don’t recognize these dimensions of the spatial privacy interest, commentators
operating within those frameworks tend to question whether they are
“real.” Yet that conclusion denies the logic of embodied, situated experience. Surveillance infrastructures alter the experience of places in
ways that do not depend entirely on whether anyone is actually watching. Governments know this well; that is part of the point of deploying
surveillance infrastructures within public spaces. It seems sounder to
conclude that the information-based frameworks are incomplete.
Conceptualizing the privacy interest as having an independently significant spatial dimension explains aspects of surveillance that neither
visibility nor informational transparency can explain.
Work in surveillance studies suggests that direct visual surveillance affects the experience of space and place in two ways that an
emphasis on informational transparency doesn’t completely capture.
First, surveillance fosters a kind of passivity that is best described as a
ceding of power over space. As geographer Hille Koskela puts it, vis41
ual surveillance constitutes “space as a container” for passive objects.
She distinguishes the spatial shaping that produces “container-space”
from the “power-space” constituted by panoptic strategies of normalization, which depend on access to particularized information. But the
“containerization” of space is itself a panoptic strategy. Panopticism in
the Foucauldian sense is both statistical and architectural; it entails
ordering of spaces to obviate the need for continual surveillance and
42
to instill tractability in those who enter. Our newspaper-reading individual cannot see whether anyone is watching her, but she can see that
the plaza has been re-architected to allow observation secretly and at
will, and that there is no obvious source of information about the surveillance and no evident method of recourse if she wishes to lodge a

Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 Tex L
Rev 1349, 1374–98 (2004).
40 See, for example, Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 397 n 1 (1978) (Powell concurring)
(observing that the Court’s prior decisions establish a “sphere of privacy or autonomy” within
the marital relationship); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 485 (1965) (describing a “zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”); Dietemann v Time, Inc, 449
F2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir 1971).
41 Hille Koskela, “The Gaze without Eyes”: Video-surveillance and the Changing Nature of
Urban Space, 24 Progress in Hum Geography 243, 250 (2000).
42 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish at 206 (cited in note 10); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 Georgetown L J 1, 23 (2006).
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complaint. In Hohfeldian terms, the reconfiguration places individuals under a twofold disability: the targets of surveillance cannot entirely avoid the gaze (except by avoiding the place) and also cannot
identify the watchers. We can say, therefore, that surveillance alters the
balance of powers and disabilities that obtains in public places. It instills an expectation of being surveilled, and contrary to the conventional legal wisdom, this reasonable expectation and the passivity that
it instills are precisely the problem.
Performance theory reminds us that individuals surveilled are not
only passive bodies, and this leads us to the second way in which surveillance affects the experience of space and place. Like identities,
places are dynamic and relational; they are constructed over time
44
through everyday practice. Surveillance alters important parameters
of both processes. Building on work in feminist geography, Koskela
argues that surveillance alters a sense of space that she calls “emotional space.” She observes that “[t]o be under surveillance is an ambivalent emotional event. A surveillance camera . . . can at the same
45
time represent safety and danger.” This point contrasts usefully with
US privacy theorists’ comparatively single-minded focus on the “chilling effect”; it reminds us that surveillance changes the affective dimension of space in ways that that formulation doesn’t address. Marc
Augé has argued that the defining feature of contemporary geography
46
is the “non-place.” Places are historical and relational; non-places
exist in the present and are characterized by a sense of temporariness,
47
openness, and solitariness. Augé does not discuss surveillance, but the
distinction between places and non-places maps well to the affective
dimension of space that Koskela identifies. Augé’s critics observe that
“placeness” is a matter of perspective; for example, airports may be
places to those who work there, while wealthy residential enclaves
48
may be non-places to those whose entry incites automatic suspicion.
It may be most accurate to conceptualize “placeness” both as a matter
of degree and as an attribute that may be experienced differently by
different groups. Along this continuum, surveillance makes places

43 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays 35–64 (Yale 1919) (Walter Wheeler Cook, ed).
44 See generally Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Blackwell 1991) (Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans).
45 Koskela, 24 Progress in Hum Geography at 257 (cited in note 41).
46 See Marc Augé, Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity 75–115
(Verso 1995) (John Howe, trans).
47 Id at 77–86.
48 See generally Peter Merriman, Driving Places: Marc Augé, Non-places, and the Geographies of England’s M1 Motorway, 21 Theory, Culture, & Socy 145 (2004).
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more like non-places. Spaces exposed by surveillance function differently than spaces that are not so exposed.
I will characterize the spatial dimension of the privacy interest as
an interest in avoiding or selectively controlling the conditions of exposure. This terminology is intended to move the discussion beyond
both visibility and transparency to capture the linked effects of architecture and power as experienced by embodied, situated subjects. With
respect to space, surveillance employs a twofold dynamic of containerization and constraint to pursue large-scale behavioral modification.
Koskela observes that surveillance makes public spaces less predictable
49
for the watched. The relation is reciprocal: surveillance also attempts
to make those spaces more predictable for the watchers. By altering the
balance of powers and disabilities, exposure changes the parameters
that shape the ongoing performance of identity, community, and place.
The effects of exposure and transparency are complementary, and
the genius of surveillance appears most clearly when one considers
them together. Transparency alters the parameters of evolving subjectivity; exposure alters the capacity of places to function as contexts
within which identity is developed and performed. Surveillance directed at transparency seeks to systematize, predict, and channel difference; surveillance directed at exposure seeks to prevent unsystematized, unpredictable difference from emerging.
III. EXPOSURE ONLINE
This understanding of the spatial dimension of privacy is relevant
not only to physical spaces, but also to the ongoing debate about privacy interests in online conduct. The mismatch between online conduct and fixed physical place is one of the principal reasons that privacy theorists have offered to support a purely information-based
definition of privacy interests. Privacy skeptics, meanwhile, assert that
whether or not online forums correspond to physical places, online
conduct that is visible to others is not private in any meaningful sense.
Both arguments overlook the extent to which online conduct and
online surveillance are experienced spatially.
Let us now zoom in on our café-sitting individual as she uses her
laptop computer to explore the web, view and download “content,”
write pseudonymous blog posts, and send email. Privacy rules derived
from ownership and expectation suggest that she can have no legally
cognizable expectation of privacy in most of these activities. The software is licensed, the communications networks are owned by third

49

Koskela, 24 Progress in Hum Geography at 250 (cited in note 41).
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parties, and it is increasingly common knowledge that online activities
are potentially subject to pervasive surveillance by governments and
commercial interests. Federal statutes carve out limited zones of privacy, but as their definitional frameworks are challenged by rapid
technological change, those statutes more often serve to highlight the
absence of a generally applicable privacy interest in online activity.
Here again, the reasonable expectation standard begs the question: when does surveillance of online activities change expectations in
a way that we as a society should find objectionable? As the hypothetical suggests, the question cannot be answered simply by invoking
an expanded conception of the privacy of the home. Information privacy theorists have objected, rightly, that this move tethers spatial privacy interests to a fixed physical space and ignores the fact that many
online activities occur outside the home. A privacy analysis for the
information age must focus on something other than physical location.
The question also cannot be answered by reifying communications networks as separate “spaces.” Online “space” is not separate
from “real” space. Communications networks are layered over and
throughout real space, producing a social space that in totality is more
50
accurately understood as networked space. Actions taken in physical
space have important consequences online, and vice versa. In ways
that “real” space does not, online “space” contains material traces of
intellectual, emotional, and relational movement, but privacy law and
policy must be crafted for those who live in the real world.
A viable theory of privacy for the networked information age
must consider the extent to which the “privacy of the home” has
served as a sort of cultural shorthand for a broader privacy interest
against exposure. The home affords a freedom of movement that is
both literal and metaphorical, and that has physical, intellectual, and
emotional dimensions: we can move from room to room, we can speak
our minds and read whatever interests us, we can pursue intimacy in
relationships. The advent of networked space challenges privacy theorists to articulate a more general account of the spatial entailments of
intellectual, emotional, and relational activities. By analogy to the
home, we might envision a zone of personal space that permits (degrees of) unconstrained, unobserved physical and intellectual movement. That zone furnishes room for a critical, playful subjectivity to
develop. This account of spatial privacy matches the experience of
privacy in ways that the purely informational conception does not.
When the spatial dimension of privacy is understood in this way,
it becomes easier to see that surveillance of online activities alters the
50

See Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 Colum L Rev 210, 235–48 (2007).
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experience of space in the same ways that surveillance of “real” places
does. From the standpoint of Foucauldian theory, surveillance of
online activities is a logical extension of the panoptic gaze, and not
only for purposes of imposing transparency and normalization. To be
most effective, the “containerization” of space must extend to intellectual, emotional, and relational processes conducted online. From the
standpoint of Deleuzian theory, surveillance of online activities furthers the goals of the surveillant assemblage; it hastens the conversion
51
of bodies and behaviors into flows of data. As in physical space, exposure of activities in networked space alters the affective dimension
of online conduct. That process in turn affects the ongoing construction of self, place, and community not only on the network, but within
networked space more generally.
Other social and technological changes also can alter the balance
of powers and disabilities that exists in networked space. Imagine now
that our café-sitting individual engages in some embarrassing and unsavory behavior—perhaps she throws her used paper cup and napkin
into the bushes, or coughs on the milk dispenser. Another patron of
the café photographs her with his mobile phone and posts the photo52
graphs to an internet site dedicated to shaming the behavior. This
example reminds us that being in public entails a degree of exposure,
and that (like informational transparency) sometimes exposure can
53
have beneficial consequences. Maybe we don’t want people to litter
54
or spread germs, or to drive aggressively, and if the potential for exposure reduces the incidence of those behaviors, so much the better.
Or suppose our café-sitter posts her own location to an internet site
55
that lets its members log their whereabouts and activities. This example reminds us that exposure may be desired and eagerly pursued; in
such cases, worries about privacy seem entirely off the mark. But the
problem of exposure in networked space is more complicated than
these examples suggest.
The sort of conduct in the first example, which antisurveillance
activist Steve Mann calls “coveillance,” figures prominently in two
different claims about diminished expectations of privacy in public.
Privacy critics argue that when technologies for surveillance are in

51

See Haggerty and Ericson, 51 Brit J Sociology at 608–09 (cited in note 21).
See, for example, HollaBackNYC, online at http://hollabacknyc.blogspot.com (visited
Jan 12, 2008); How Drunk Am I?, online at http://www.howdrunkami.com (visited Jan 12, 2008).
See also Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 Cardozo L Rev 2321, 2325–29 (2007).
53 It also reminds us that online “space” and “real” space are not separate.
54 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 NYU L Rev 1699 (2006).
55 See, for example, Twitter, online at http://www.twitter.com (visited Jan 12, 2008).
52
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common use, their availability can eliminate expectations of privacy
that might previously have existed. Mann argues that because coveillance involves observation by equals, it avoids the troubling political
56
implications of surveillance. But if the café-sitter’s photograph had
been posted to a site that collects photographs of “hot chicks,” many
women would understand the photographer’s conduct as an act of
57
subordination. And there is more than an element of bootstrapping
to the argument that coveillance eliminates expectations of privacy
vis-à-vis surveillance. This is so whether or not one accepts the argument that coveillance and surveillance are meaningfully different. If
they are different, then coveillance doesn’t justify or excuse the exercise of power that surveillance represents. If they are the same, then
the interest against exposure applies equally to both.
In practice, the relation between surveillance and coveillance is
more mutually constituting than either of these arguments acknowledges. Many employers now routinely search the internet for information about prospective hires, so what began as “ordinary” coveillance
can become the basis for a probabilistic judgment about attributes,
abilities, and aptitudes. At other times, public authorities seek to harness the distributed power of coveillance for their own purposes—for
example, by requesting identification of people photographed at pro58
test rallies. Here what began as surveillance becomes an exercise of
distributed moral and political power, but it is power called forth for a
particular purpose.
The relation between surveillance and self-exposure is similarly
complex. Exposure is a critical enabler of interpersonal association;
indeed, some feminist theorists argue that we are constituted pre59
dominantly by our relationships. From this perspective, the argument
that privacy functions principally to enable interpersonal intimacy gets
60
it only half right. Intimate relationships, community relationships,
56 Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman, Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 Surveillance & Socy
331, 348 (2003).
57 See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web; Law Students Feel Lasting Effects of Anonymous Attacks, Wash Post A01 (Mar 7, 2007); Jill Filipovic, Hi, I’m Jill, and Scummy
Law School Sleazebags Have Gone after Me, Too, Feministe (Mar 7, 2007), online at http://www. feministe.us/ blog/archives/2007/03/07/wapo-calls-out-law-school-pervs (visited Jan 12, 2008).
58 See Wayne Harrison, CU Posts Pictures of Pot-smoking Event: Reward Offered for Information about People in Photos, ABC 7 News Online (Apr 28, 2006), online at http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/9063737/detail.html (visited Jan 12, 2008); Texas Border Watch, http://www.texasborderwatch.com (visited Jan 12, 2008).
59 See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in Robert
Post, ed, Law and the Order of Culture 162, 169 (California 1991).
60 See, for example, Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 74–94 (Oxford 1992);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L J 475, 484 (1968).
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and more casual relationships all derive from selective exposure: from
the ability to control in different ways and to differing extents what
61
Erving Goffman called the “presentation of self.” It is this recognition that underlies the different levels of “privacy” enabled by some
62
(though not all) social networking sites. Scholars who study queer
communities argue that exposure of matters conventionally considered “private” fulfills a similar function, enabling the formation of
alternative communities constituted around challenges to conven63
tional models of intimacy. Surveillance changes the various dynamics
of selective exposure, but the strand of surveillance studies literature
affiliated with performance theory argues that exposure to surveillance can be similarly productive. Surveillance cameras can represent
an invitation to perform in ways that transgress stated or implicit
norms or exaggerate imputed characteristics; by the same token, selfexposure using networked information technologies can operate as
64
resistance to narratives imposed by others. The performative impulse
introduces static into the circuits of the surveillant assemblage; it seeks
to reclaim bodies and reappropriate spaces.
As this analysis suggests, interpreting self-exposure either as a
blanket waiver of privacy or as an exercise in personal empowerment
would be far too simple. Surveillance and self-exposure bleed into one
another in the same ways that surveillance and coveillance do. As Jane
Bailey and Ian Kerr demonstrate, and as millions of subscribers to
social networking sites are now beginning to learn, the ability to control the terms of self-exposure in networked space is largely illusory:
body images intended to assert feminist self-ownership are remixed as
pornography, while revelations intended for particular social networks
are accessed with relative ease by employers, police, and other author65
ity figures. Other scholars raise important questions about the origins
of the desire for exposure. In an increasing number of contexts, the
images generated by surveillance have fetish value. As Kirstie Ball
puts it, surveillance creates a “political economy of interiority” organ-

61 See generally Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (cited in note 24);
Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, Crowding (Brooks/Cole 1975).
62 See, for example, Protect Your Privacy, Facebook, online at http://www.facebook.com/
sitetour/privacy.php (visited Jan 12, 2008).
63 See McGrath, Loving Big Brother at 61–62 (cited in note 26). See generally Michael
Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (Zone Books 2002).
64 See McGrath, Loving Big Brother at 14–16 (cited in note 26); Koskela, Webcams, TV
Shows, and Mobile Phones at 206–07 (cited in note 26).
65 Jane Bailey and Ian Kerr, Seizing Control?: The Experience Capture Experiments of
Ringley and Mann, 9 Ethics & Info Tech 129, 132, 137 (2007).
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ized around “the ‘authenticity’ of the captured experience.” Within this
political economy, self-exposure “may represent patriotic or participa67
tive values to the individual,” but it also may be a behavior called forth
by surveillance and implicated in its informational and spatial logics.
These examples argue for more careful exploration of the individual and systemic consequences of exposure within networked
space, however it is caused. While the law should not ignore changing
social dynamics, it also should not overlook or oversimplify their
causes and effects. Exposure online is a matter of concern for the
same reasons that exposure in “real” space is; indeed, as the phenomenon of coveillance shows, the two cannot really be separated.
IV. TRANSPARENCY, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY SELF-DEFENSE
Finally, understanding privacy interests as including interests
against both transparency and exposure raises questions about the
efficacy of tools and practices for privacy self-defense. Modes of privacy self-defense directed solely at minimizing or equalizing visual or
informational accessibility do not necessarily address the more general problems of transparency and exposure. Even if tools for privacy
self-defense were designed with these more general problems in mind,
it’s not clear that the effort would succeed.
To see why, consider two general classes of privacy self-defense
tools. The first consist of tools for “watching from below,” or “sousveillance.” A leading exponent of sousveillance is Mann, who employs
wearable cameras to document visual surveillance in progress. When
challenged by property managers or security personnel, he answers
that the cameras are not under his direct control, and that it’s up to his
“controller” whether to turn them off. Mann envisions sousveillance
as a species of situationist critique of surveillance: it is a way to “chal68
lenge and problematize both surveillance and acquiescence to it.”
As political performance art, sousveillance is brilliant. At times,
however, Mann also appears to envision the condition of constant
sousveillance as a normatively desirable way of living in the world. He
contrasts the “reflectionism” of sousveillance with top-down privacy
regulation, which he characterizes as a “pacifier,” and argues that
69
sousveillance emphasizes equality and participation. That may be so,
but sousveillance does not change the architectural conditions of sur66 Kirstie Ball, Exposure: Exploring the Subject of Surveillance 4–5 (unpublished manuscript, 2007).
67 Id at 1. See also Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 723, 743–45 (1999).
68 Mann, Nolan, and Wellman, 1 Surveillance & Socy at 332 (cited in note 56).
69 Id at 333, 345–47. See also David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force
Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? 3–26 (Addison-Wesley 1998).
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veillance or the underlying inequalities that they reinforce. Nor does it
challenge internalization of the condition of exposure; if anything,
widespread sousveillance likely would produce the opposite effect.
The second general class of privacy self-defense tools consists of
tools for hiding from surveillance. For example, portable Faraday
cages can shield embedded radio-frequency identification (RFID)
70
chips against external scanning. Many privacy activists recommend
that holders of RFID-embedded passports keep them in aluminum
foil wrappers to prevent unauthorized capture of encoded personal
information; one might do the same for one’s EZ Pass transponder
between transaction points. Other technologies enable anonymization
of emails and blog posts; some privacy activists and entrepreneurs
have envisioned anonymization becoming routine for a much broader
range of online transactions and interactions.
These examples illustrate that hiding from surveillance can be
easy in some contexts, but they also illustrate that even a robust commitment to hiding would be extraordinarily difficult for ordinary individuals to sustain in the face of routine practices of embedded computing that pervade networked space. One cannot escape the fact that
the RFID transmitter must be removed from its protective coating in
order to serve its intended purpose, which might be one that the individual wants or needs. At transaction points, the encoded information
must be accessible, and at those locations the individual is exposed.
Similarly, major commercial web sites generally are not configured to
permit anonymous or robustly pseudonymous transactions. It is overwhelmingly likely that transaction points will continue to proliferate.
For most people, the rewards of hiding won’t outweigh the convenience of technologies like EZ Pass or the seduction of customer loyalty programs. Normatively speaking, it seems unfair to place responsibility for hiding on individuals when the deck is stacked so definitively against them.
Focusing on the spatial dimension of the privacy interest reminds
us that hiding carries other costs as well, and not only those costs that
are conventionally recognized. In “real” space, hiding generally is not
considered a socially neutral activity. Unless it’s Halloween or Mardi
Gras, we tend to presume that people who wear masks in public are
up to no good. But we presume this in part because a wide range of
middle options—degrees of de facto anonymity and pseudonymity—
has usually been available. Currently online spaces, like real spaces,

70 See Faraday Cage, SearchSecurity.com, (Information Security Magazine, Dec 21, 2003),
online at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci942282,00.html (visited Jan
12, 2008).
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support a variety of norms regarding “nymity.” In some online
spaces, nymity is the rule; in others, it occurs often enough to be unremarkable; in others, it is unimportant; in still others, it is perceived as
creating risks that may threaten the community’s reason for being. If
forced or trivially easy identification became the norm, we might come
to embrace more committed hiding in a broader range of circumstances.
But, just as the nature of “real” space would change profoundly if everyone wore either a bar code or a mask, the feel of online spaces, and of
networked space more generally, will change accordingly.
The lesson of these examples is not that privacy self-defense is a bad
idea, but rather that privacy self-defense alone can’t neutralize either the
institutional predicates of transparency or the architectural predicates of
exposure. Privacy self-defense operates at the individual level, while surveillance operates at the collective level. The informational and spatial
logics of surveillance require a considered, collective response.
CONCLUSION
Within the discourse of privacy, the language of visibility both
conceals and reveals. Understanding privacy as an interest against
visibility/informational accessibility misses an important piece of the
logic of informational transparency. The privacy interest against transparency encompasses not only the individualized information that
surveillance collects, but also the informational frameworks that it
imposes. Yet the problem of visual privacy also points us to dimensions of the privacy interest that a focus on privacy as relative informational opacity cannot explain. Privacy encompasses an interest in
the structure of experienced space, and this interest is threatened under conditions of visual or informational exposure.
Both transparency and exposure are questions of degree; the law
can’t (and shouldn’t) regulate every instance of either. But privacy law
and theory should recognize them as independent harms, so that a
conversation about possible responses can proceed.

71 Ian Kerr and Alex Cameron, Nymity, P2P, and ISPs: Lessons from BMG Canada Inc. v.
John Doe, in Katherine Strandburg and Daniela Stan Raicu, eds, Privacy and Technologies of
Identity: A Cross-disciplinary Conversation 269, 271–72 (Springer 2006).

